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Introduction 
 
This article revisits the fundamental right1 of the parties to nominate or appoint 
arbitrators of their choice. It examines the selection process and practical 
considerations in choosing a sole arbitrator and a panel of arbitrators, dealing with 
party appointed arbitrators and the chairman.2 This is examined from the perspective 
of ad hoc and institutional arbitrations. The default provisions of various national 
arbitration laws are examined. In discussing institutional arbitration, the arbitration 
rules of various institutions provide necessary insight. Arbitral practice and relevant 
court decisions are also examined. 
 
It is universally acknowledged that, “the quality of arbitration proceeding depends to 
a large extent on the quality and skill of the arbitrators chosen.”3 The parties have 
chosen to opt out of litigation where a judge is appointed for them, into arbitration 
where they choose their own judge. They are the constructors of their dispute 
resolution mechanism and are therefore presumed to know who best should resolve 
their dispute. Thus the importance of the selection and appointment of the right 
arbitrator for the dispute cannot be over emphasized.4 
 
The distinguishing feature of this article is the fact that it actually discusses and raises 
questions on the practice of interviewing prospective arbitrators. It also discusses the 
various issues to consider in exercising this fundamental right and its necessity in the 
first place, to assist parties and their advisers in the drafting of the appointment 
agreement; embarking on the selection process within the framework of acceptable 
international arbitral practice, standards and law. Arbitrator selection and appointment 
are squarely within the control and power of the parties. These are acts within the first 
frame of the arbitration process.5 
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This article is based on certain assumptions – One, that the intended arbitration is over 
an international dispute.6 This would in effect delimit the jurisdiction of the article.7 
Two, that the arbitrators, whether sole, chairman or party appointed are expected to be 
neutral, adhering to the same standards of impartiality, independence and disclosure 
requirements.8 Third, the office of the umpire does not apply so that the arbitrators 
shall not thereby act as advocates of the parties at any time.9 The issues raised in this 
article regarding the selection and appointment of arbitrators equally apply whether 
the international dispute is strictly of a commercial, investment or public law nature 
(where a State, or a State-controlled entity is involved) However, it must be conceded 
that certain issues (for example, the nationality of the arbitrators) assume more 
significance depending on the nature of the parties involved.10 
  
Necessity of Selection of Arbitrators  
 
One of the major differences between consensual arbitration and litigation (which is 
also seen as one of its main advantages) is the fact that the parties can and do select or 
choose their own dispute-resolver or judge called an ‘arbitrator’. In litigation, the 
parties accept whichever judge is assigned their case. In arbitration, the parties get to 
choose. Two prominent international arbitrators, writing on this point, have asserted 
that, “Once a decision to refer a dispute to arbitration has been made, nothing is more 
important than choosing the right arbitral tribunal. It is a choice which is important 
not only for the parties to the particular dispute, but also for the reputation and 
standing of the arbitral process itself.”11 Thus to make an informed choice, the party 
has certain clear attributes it must look for in the prospective arbitrator. This would of 
necessity, depend on what the party hopes to achieve from the arbitration.12 This of 
course, would differ depending on whether the party is a claimant or respondent, 
solvent or insolvent, amongst others. 
 
In recognition of the primacy of this empowerment in arbitration, most arbitration 
laws following the New York Convention13 and the Model Law,14 would set aside an 
award where, “The composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral procedure was 
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not in accordance with the agreement of the parties - - -”.15 This therefore makes it of 
utmost importance that the arbitral tribunal is properly composed. The proper 
composition of the arbitral tribunal is a matter the parties can waive during the arbitral 
proceeding. This the parties do, where (during the arbitral proceeding) they fail to 
raise the issue or contest it or reserve their right to raise it at the enforcement or 
setting aside stage.16 This waiver requirement ensures that parties do not (deliberately 
or otherwise) sleep on their rights and freely frustrate the whole arbitral process where 
the award goes against them.  
 
The question of proper composition of the tribunal is also a jurisdictional one, which 
the arbitral tribunal is empowered by practically all arbitration laws to decide.17 In 
Brazil, where arbitrators enjoy partial immunity, nullifying the award on this ground 
is couched in terms of the award being made by, “a person who could not be an 
arbitrator.” This may raise issues of personal liability against the arbitrator, especially 
where s/he had committed a fraudulent misrepresentation unknown to the parties 
during the proceeding and only discovered thereafter.18 
 
Parties embark on arbitration to resolve a dispute or difference arising between them. 
They commence the proceedings to get a recognizable and enforceable award (baring 
settlement). Thus anything that would deprive them of obtaining a valid award at the 
end of the procedure is anathema and must be avoided. The composition (i.e., The 
selection and appointment) of the tribunal must therefore be in accordance with the 
agreement of the parties.  
 
Parties Agreement 
 
As a prerequisite of achieving this, the parties must agree on the composition of the 
arbitral tribunal. There are several recognized ways by which the parties can ‘agree’ 
on such composition. The parties can exercise this right by expressly agreeing on the 
appointment procedure in their arbitration agreement. They can achieve this by 
agreeing on the number of arbitrators and how they would be appointed.19 All 
arbitration laws recognize this right of the parties.20 The parties can nominate a third 
party to make the appointment for and on their behalf. Appointments made thereto are 
validly made ‘by the parties’. This is because such appointments are made under the 
‘seal’ of the parties. 
 
Thus the parties can validly nominate an appointing authority to make the necessary 
appointments. They can expressly choose to use a List procedure for the 
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appointment.21 The parties can, in a Submission agreement, directly appoint the 
person(s) to act as arbitrator(s).22 These all apply in ad hoc arbitrations. Where the 
parties adopt institutional arbitration rules, without making any other express 
selection or appointment provision, they choose the selection and appointment 
procedure of the relevant institution as published in their rules (and unpublished 
internal rules). This is simply because the arbitration rules of the particular institution 
becomes an extension of the provisions of the arbitration agreement between the 
parties.23 By choosing the relevant rules in their arbitration agreement, the parties 
incorporate such rules into the arbitration agreement. The express provisions of the 
arbitration agreement would, to the extent of any inconsistency with a non-mandatory 
provision of the rules, override and be applied. 
 
Some arbitration institution rules provide that the parties may nominate (or designate) 
arbitrators for its appointment. Such institutions are not bound to appoint the 
arbitrators nominated by the parties.24 This eventuality complies with parties 
appointing the arbitrators. This is because the parties, in their arbitration agreement 
(including the rules of the institution) have provided this protective caveat.  
 
A necessary question that arises is determining at what point the institution’s 
arbitration rules become part and parcel of the arbitration agreement. If it is at the 
time of conclusion of the arbitration agreement, then the applicable rules would be the 
rules in force at the time of the conclusion of the arbitration agreement. However, 
arbitration institutions provide that the effective rules will be those in force when the 
dispute arises.25 This would in effect mean that the arbitration rules do not practically 
become part of the arbitration agreement until the dispute arises and the arbitration 
agreement becomes effective. This therefore implies that the applicable rules would 
be those in force at the date the arbitration agreement becomes effective.  
 
Another related point is the fact that the legal relationship between the parties and the 
arbitration institution does not come into existence until the dispute has arisen and the 
arbitration institution, having being notified of its choice, accepts to administer the 
dispute resolution process under its rules. It is at this point, when the offer by the 
parties to the arbitration institution to administer the arbitration has been accepted by 
the institution, that the arbitration rules of the institution can actually become 
effective as part of the arbitration agreement.26 As a matter of practical relevance, the 
arbitration rules of the chosen institution become relevant only after the institution has 
accepted to administer the arbitration. The relevant rules would be those operative at 
that relevant time.  
 
This throws up another question: whether the parties can change the institution named 
in the arbitration agreement before the institution is notified of its nomination. The 
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answer would be a ‘Yes’. The parties can amend their agreement so long as they 
mutually agree. One party cannot however, unilaterally amend the arbitration 
agreement. Even though a third party, the arbitration institution, has been mentioned 
in the arbitration agreement, it only becomes involved in the arbitration agreement 
when it has knowledge of its appointment and accepts the appointment. The parties 
can amend the arbitration agreement and choose a different arbitration institution (or 
even decide to have an ad hoc arbitration) when the dispute arises before the named 
arbitration institution is notified and accepts to act. Likewise, the named arbitration 
institution can upon notification, decline to accept the invitation to administer the 
arbitration. This non-acceptance does not nullify the arbitration agreement (to which it 
is not a party even though mentioned in it). The parties can contest the arbitration 
institutions decision in a national court or appoint another institution in its place. They 
will only be required to amend the arbitration agreement to accommodate the newly 
appointed institution.27  
 
Party Selection 
 
Thus having established the various ways parties can agree on the appointment of 
arbitrators, we now turn to the selection requirements. We start by posing the 
question: ‘Can parties select?’ To answer this question, we must look at various 
arbitration laws, rules and commentaries. Parties can and do select the arbitrators. 
Tore Wiwen-Nilsson sees the selection of an arbitrator as, “the process by which an 
individual is found suitable to become an arbitrator.”28 The selection process, of 
necessity, precedes the nomination, confirmation and appointment of the arbitrator(s).   
 
Sole arbitrators 
Where the arbitration agreement requires a sole arbitrator to be appointed, it may 
provide the method or means of appointment. In Submission agreements, the 
particular arbitrator to act may be appointed and named in the arbitration agreement. 
It is submitted that since Submission agreements are concluded after the dispute has 
arisen, the parties would contact and get the acceptance of the proposed sole arbitrator 
to act before naming him in the Submission agreement. This being the case, the sole 
arbitrator so named in the Submission agreement, would have consented to so act.29 
 
It is an acknowledged fact that most arbitration agreements are pre-dispute and do not 
contain the name(s) of the arbitrator(s).30 The arbitration agreement may however, 
indicate the number of arbitrators and how they would be appointed. In ad hoc 
proceedings, the arbitration agreement may nominate an appointing authority to make 
the appointment of the sole arbitrator. The arbitration agreement may also give 
                                                 
27
 This situation would not fall under Article II.3 NYC because the arbitration agreement is always 
capable of being performed as long as the parties are willing to give it effect. The decline of a named 
arbitration institution to act should not make the agreement, “null and void, inoperative or incapable of 
being performed”. 
28
 In a Paper delivered at the British Institute of International & Comparative Law (BIICL) Arbitration 
Practitioner Workshop series in London (17/02/2004) titled, “The Selection, Status and Immunity of 
Arbitrators.” 
29
 This is very important since in Article 1448 para.3, NCCP France, a submission agreement becomes 
null and void, “if an arbitrator appointed therein fails to accept his mission.”  
30
 See Emilia Onyema, “Drafting an Effective Arbitration Agreement in International Commercial 
Contracts,” 7 VJ 277 at 283 (2003);  
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guidelines on relevant qualifications, skills, expertise, or otherwise required of the 
appointee. 
 
Arbitration laws make default provisions for the appointment of arbitrators to apply 
where the parties have not made any provisions. The UNCITRAL Rules of 
Arbitration in article 6 provides that either party may propose, “the names of one or 
more persons, one of whom would serve as the sole arbitrator.” The UNCITRAL 
system envisages the presence of an appointing authority to function, especially where 
the parties cannot agree on an appointee. Therefore, UNCITRAL Rules provide that if 
the parties have not nominated an appointing authority then they can ask the Secretary 
General of the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague to designate an 
appointing authority for them. 
 
Where the parties entrust the appointment of the arbitrator(s) to an appointing 
authority, they exercise their appointment rights and powers indirectly. The law 
bestows the appointing power on the parties who in turn confer or delegate such 
power on the appointing authority to exercise on their behalf. The appointing 
authority would be acting as an agent of a disclosed principal (the parties) in making 
the appointments. It does not act in its name but in the name of the parties. The 
appointing authority’s mandate is to appoint the arbitrators. Its mandate terminates 
once it has made the appointments.31 The parties and the appointees then agree terms 
of the appointment. Thus the appointing authority would not incur any personal 
liabilities either to the parties nor the arbitrators. However under Section 2GN of Part 
1A of the Hong Kong Ordinance, an appointing authority may incur liabilities where 
it performs (or omits to perform) an act dishonestly.32 
 
Where there is no appointing authority, the parties can adopt the List system in 
making the appointment. Article 6(3) of the UNCITRAL Rules gives a description of 
the List system to be adopted by an appointing authority. The only difference when 
there is no appointing authority is that the List is exchanged directly between the 
parties (or more appropriately between their lawyers). In the List procedure, the 
parties exchange either simultaneously or concurrently, a list containing different 
names ranked in order of preference. Where there is an appointing authority, it would 
send out an identical list to the parties. The parties then choose the proposed 
appointees in other of preference. Where an appointing authority is involved, the 
parties will delete the names they object to and number the other names in order of 
preference. They would then return the amended list to the appointing authority. The 
appointing authority would appoint one of the arbitrators from the ranked lists. There 
may usually be some recurring names on both lists that the appointing authority may 
select, depending on the ranking of the names on the lists. It is quite possible where 
one party is uncooperative for the diligent party to appoint the sole arbitrator. This 
appointment will be binding on the other party.33 
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Panel of Three Arbitrators 
In a panel of three or more arbitrators, the laws make subtle differences regarding 
appointment of arbitrators. Generally, it is acknowledged that in a panel of uneven 
number of arbitrators, each party appoints one arbitrator and the two party-appointed 
arbitrators would jointly appoint the third arbitrator to act as chairman.34 Some laws 
require the parties to appoint the chairman while some require the two party appointed 
arbitrators to make the appointment. In practice, it is admitted that generally, the party 
appointed arbitrators consult the appointing parties on the appointment of the 
chairman.  
 
This becomes an issue because in international arbitration the party-appointed 
arbitrators do not act and are not perceived to act as agents or representatives of the 
appointing parties. Why then refer to the appointing party? The issue here might be 
the juggling of two very important principles of international arbitration: the 
fundamental right of the parties to appoint the arbitrators against the independence 
and neutrality of the party-appointed arbitrators. This does not seem to currently 
present insurmountable problems in international arbitral practice. However, where 
the party-appointed arbitrator believes that its appointing party is being unreasonable 
in its conditions or rejection of candidates nominated for appointment as chairman, 
the options open to him will be dependent on the provisions of such applicable laws. 
 
In this scenario, the provisions of the relevant law become important. Where the law 
does not require an imput from the parties, then the party-appointed arbitrator can 
disregard consulting the appointing party (or its opinion). However, where the law 
provides or alludes to the appointing party’s ability or right to make imputs or make 
the appointment, then the party-appointed arbitrator cannot disregard the appointing 
party’s imput (or opinion). This became a real issue where in Tackaberry v Phaidon 
Navegacion S.A.,35 the party-appointed arbitrators agreed fees with the umpire 
nominated by them  (the nomination was with the approval of the parties) which the 
parties refused to pay. The judge held that by authorizing the party-appointed 
arbitrators to appoint the umpire (in this case) the parties by implication authorized 
them to agree his fees to which they are bound and should pay.  
 
Where the parties entrust the appointment of the chairman to a third party, for 
example an appointing authority,36 the parties appoint the two party-appointed 
arbitrators while the appointing authority appoints the chairman on behalf of the 
parties. The appointing authority can also be empowered to appoint all members of 
the arbitral tribunal on behalf of the parties. Whatever the final appointment 
procedure, the appointment of the arbitrators is deemed made by the parties, directly 
or indirectly. 
 
Institutional arbitration 
The dynamics of the arbitration relationships change immediately upon the 
introduction of an active third party participant, the arbitration institution. The 
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 Article 7.1. UNCITRAL Rules. The rules also provide for the appointing authority to appoint the 
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35
 [1992] ADRLJ 112 
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arbitration institution does not just act as an appointing authority as we have seen 
above. It does much more than that. Generally the depth of involvement of arbitration 
institutions in arbitrations they administer vary. Some do little more than appointing 
authorities by determining and paying the fees and expenses of the arbitrators and 
providing administrative assistance.37 These institutions mostly administer their 
arbitrations under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules of 1976, which in some cases 
have been very slightly modified.38 A majority of other arbitration institutions have 
adopted their own rules (though some are heavily influenced by the UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules). These rules are modified from time to time as the arbitration 
terrain changes. 
 
The first major difference in this regard, is the fact that arbitration institution rules 
provide for party ‘nomination’ of arbitrators who would then be appointed by the 
institution in its name and on its terms. These terms would include any requirements 
contained in the arbitration agreement. Thus, it is the arbitration institution mandated 
by the arbitration agreement that appoints the arbitrators. Since the arbitration 
institution rules have been adopted as part of the parties’ arbitration agreement, the 
institution acts under instruction from the parties. Thus, unlike the appointing 
authority scenario in ad hoc arbitration, the arbitration institution makes the 
appointment, not on behalf of the parties, but for itself. The parties in their arbitration 
agreement have ‘contracted’ the arbitration institution to appoint the arbitrators. Thus 
even where the parties nominate arbitrators for appointment by the institution, the 
institution has the ultimate responsibility of appointing arbitrators in accordance with 
its rules. This in most cases would amount to the appointment of arbitrators assessed 
by the institution as being impartial, independent and suitable for the particular 
dispute. It can therefore be argued that the ultimate responsibility for the appointment 
of impartial, independent and suitable arbitrators, in accordance with its published 
rules, lie with the arbitration institutions.39 
 
Some arbitration institutions appoint the sole arbitrator and the chairman in a panel of 
arbitrators.40 Some rules allow the parties to make recommendations from which the 
institution would choose. However, the rules provide that institutions are not bound to 
appoint the arbitrator nominated by the parties. This provision is further proof that the 
institutions appoint arbitrators in their own name. Whether the arbitration institution 
appoints the arbitrators independently or on recommendation or by nomination of the 
parties, the appointment is still traceable to the parties pursuant to the provisions of 
their arbitration agreement. The arbitration institution may act as another layer of 
insurance to ensure that the proper arbitrators are appointed.  
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 Examples include the AALCC Arbitration Centres in Cairo, Kuala Lumpur, Lagos; HKIAC 
38
 An example is the Cairo Regional Centre for International Commercial Arbitration Rules. 
39
 In the Australian case of Road Rejuvenating & Repair Services v Mitchell, 1 ADRLJ 46 (1992) where 
the arbitrator was removed, the court observed that, “the arbitrator was appointed (by) the President of 
the Institute of Arbitrators. That body is not before me, but it should stand behind its appointed officers 
as I would expect the Institute itself to bear the cost of all the parties to this dispute.” 
40
 See Article 5.5 LCIA Rules; Article 24 CIETAC Rules, 2000; Article 9 (3) ICC Rules 1998; Article 
16 (4) (5) SCC Rules 1999 
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Selection Criteria 
 
The criteria parties would take into consideration in selecting arbitrators depend on 
what the goals of the selecting party are with regards to its participation in the 
arbitration. Where the party does not have any interests or incentives in pursuing the 
arbitration (typically assumed to be the position of most respondents) it might decide 
not to cooperate with the other party and frustrate the proceedings as much as is 
possible. It might refuse or fail to meet appointment deadlines as provided in the 
laws/rules or even refuse to make any appointments.41 It might delay the proceedings 
by repeatedly asking for extension of time very close to agreed deadlines. The arbitral 
tribunal would have to indulge such dilatory tactics (for some time) so as not to 
jeopardize its award for failing to give the party an opportunity to present its case and 
answer to that of its opponent.42 The tribunal would carefully document all such    
dilatory actions in its award to show that the party was actually given the opportunity 
to participate fully in the proceedings. In this case, the parties would need to appoint 
arbitrators who are flexible but firm enough to appreciate and provide for these 
dilatory tactics. 
 
A party might seek to wear the other party out by a long drawn out arbitral process. 
This is especially true where the other party’s financial position is suspected of being 
unstable or on shaky grounds. The arbitrator must be able to identify this and deal 
with it appropriately. This calls for experience on the part of the sole arbitrator or 
chairman of the arbitral tribunal. The experience gained from past involvement in 
international arbitrations would assist the arbitrator in identifying these measures and 
taking necessary steps within applicable rules and laws. 
 
In a panel of three arbitrators, the arbitrators are a team and so each arbitrator must be 
a team player. He must be capable of working with the other members of the tribunal, 
especially where they are of different nationalities and legal backgrounds with the 
variable legal and socio-cultural differences. It is not enough (and may even be 
unnecessary) for the party-appointed arbitrators to each seek to ally with the 
chairman. Most rules require an award by a majority and not necessarily one in which 
the chairman concurred. It is important to select a team player with good marketing 
skills. This of course depends on the appointing party’s good faith in participating in 
the arbitration. It is submitted that the good (or bad) faith of a party to an international 
arbitration should be an inconsequential and irrelevant point once it has appointed its 
arbitrator. This is for the simple reason that an international arbitrator once appointed 
(whether by a party or otherwise) does not act as a representative or agent of the 
appointing party. He is (or at least ought to be) completely neutral, owing duties to all 
parties involved in the dispute. 
 
The professional qualification or expertise of the arbitrator would be dependent on the 
requirements of the parties (as provided in the arbitration agreement) and on the 
exegesis of the dispute. The need for the arbitrator to equally be an expert in the 
relevant field may be unnecessary. This is because international arbitral tribunals have 
access to expert witnesses. However, the nature of the dispute might require persons 
with technical knowledge in the requisite field. In this case, a sole arbitrator with 
                                                 
41
 Libya in the Oil Concession cases referred to above refused to appoint arbitrators or participate in the 
arbitration proceedings. 
42
 See Article V. 1 (b) NYC; Article 34 (2) (a) (ii) Model Law; S. 33 (1) EAA 
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expertise in the relevant field and international arbitration experience might meet the 
needs of the parties. It is however, suggested that in such technically complex 
disputes, a panel of arbitrators may be most suitable. This would again depend on 
proportionality of value and complexity of the dispute. However, in a panel of 
arbitrators, it may suffice if the chairman is a lawyer with arbitral expertise while the 
party appointees are both experts in the relevant field.43 This is especially useful 
where the issues are open to different technical interpretations. The additional 
requirement for each of the party-appointed arbitrators would then be their abilities of 
persuasion and team spirit. It must be mentioned that young aspiring arbitrators can be 
very useful in panels of arbitrators, especially in disputes in their particular areas of 
specialization. They would bring their expertise, enthusiasm and fresh ideas to the 
tribunal. They would usually have the time to give to the proceedings. 
 
The arbitrator must be available. It is not cost effective and can be quite frustrating to 
appoint arbitrators who just cannot devote the time needed to the proceedings, 
regardless of how experienced they are perceived to be. This is especially true of the 
very big names in international arbitration who, possibly may be constrained to take 
on more disputes than they can effectively and efficiently deal with. To achieve this 
and also help arbitrators determine if they have the time, the parties (or more 
particularly their lawyers) should have a reasonably good idea of how much time the 
whole proceeding from the filing of case statements to the close of hearings would 
take. Such projections would assist arbitrators when approached in determining their 
availability.  
 
There is hardly any international arbitration proceeding that comes as a surprise to 
any party these days. This is for the simple reason that most arbitration agreements 
are pre-dispute; the parties are fully aware when the breakdown in their relationship 
occurs; parties seem to increasingly try settlement (even if it is just negotiation) 
before commencing arbitration proceedings. The fact that there is an arbitration 
agreement between the parties puts them on notice once a dispute that appears to defy 
settlement arises. Thus, parties (their lawyers) can be expected to reasonably have an 
indication of the time scale for the proceeding. This would greatly assist prospective 
arbitrators in declining or accepting offers to arbitrate disputes from parties. 
 
The arbitrator must be reasonably familiar with the language(s) of the arbitration 
proceedings. Each language has connotations and anecdotes, the understanding of 
which comes with familiarity. This would help the arbitrator understand the dispute 
and the position of the parties. It of course is cost effective, as the additional costs (as 
per additional expenses and billable time) of interpretation would be avoided. 
 
Nationality of parties and arbitrators is a prominent factor in international 
arbitration.44 A major factor of its internationality is the fact that in most cases, the 
parties have different nationalities. The ICC Court takes the nationality of the parties 
into consideration in appointing sole arbitrators or chairmen of panel of arbitrators.45 
                                                 
43
 See the mandatory requirements of article 13 Arbitration Law PRC; Wendy Miles, “Practical Issues 
for Appointment of Arbitrators: Lawyer vs Non-Lawyer and Sole Arbitrator vs Panel of Three (or 
More),” 20(3) JIA 219 (2003) 
44
 See Andersen Consulting v Arthur Andersen & Andersen Worldwide, 10(4) Am. Rev. Int. Arb. 437 
(1999) 
45
 Article 9.5 ICC Rules 
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This is particularly important in arbitrations involving State parties.46 In nationality-
sensitive disputes, e.g. foreign direct investment disputes, appointing nationals of 
other States, not implicated in the dispute, may increase the confidence of the parties 
in the process and its outcome. 
  
Choosing the chairman or presiding arbitrator raises some additional issues. The 
parties may make contributions to the person to be appointed.47 In practice, the parties 
are consulted either through the party-appointed arbitrators or directly. This all 
depends on who nominates or appoints the presiding arbitrator. The parties may in 
addition consider, the nominees managerial abilities. This would include his ability to 
manage fellow arbitrators, parties and their lawyers, administrative personnel, the 
dispute and the procedure.48   
 
Selection Process 
 
Interviewing prospective arbitrators is practically becoming a principle of customary 
international arbitral practice. The parties and/or their lawyers conduct such 
interviews. What happens in these interviews? To answer this question, we must start 
from the motivating factors for such interview in the first place. We have given a very 
broad and general description of attributes parties need to look out for in prospective 
arbitrators for appointment. It is to be safely assumed that most of these attributes are 
confirmed satisfactorily present before prospective arbitrators are short-listed for the 
interview stage. These might include attributes such as language skill, expertise, past 
arbitration experience and personality. This narrows down the number of 
interviewees.  
 
It would be expected that at the interview stage, the availability, chemistry, 
relationships (for independence of the candidates) and any other particular issues 
maybe reviewed.49 Lew. Mistelis and Kroll give a further insight in stating that, “It is 
essential that arbitrators remember they are being paid for their services which include 
not only professional skill and judgment, but also independence and impartiality, 
efficiency and expedition. By meeting and talking to potential arbitrators before 
nomination or appointment parties have an opportunity to appraise the arbitrators 
approach to these issues.”50 
 
However, views apparently differ. Professor Martin Hunter speaking for himself says, 
“Where I am representing a client in an arbitration, what I am really looking for in a 
party-nominated arbitrator is someone with the maximum predisposition towards my 
client, but with the minimum appearance of bias.”51 This seems to be the standard 
applied by appointors of arbitrators.52  Doak Bishop and Lucy Reed see this as, “a 
                                                 
46
 See Article 39 ICSID Convention and Rule 1.3 ICSID Arbitration Rules 
47
 Article 6.4. AAA IA Rules requires the administrator to invite consultations from the parties in 
making such appointments. 
48
 See Thomas Webster, op. cit.  
49
 See Article 5.1 IBA Rules of Ethics for International Arbitrators 
50
 Lew, Mistelis & Kroll, at para.10-31 
51
 Martin Hunter, “Ethics of the International Arbitrator,” 53 Arb 219 at 223 (1987) 
52
 Doak Bishop & Lucy Reed, “Practical Guidelines for Interviewing, Selecting and Challenging Party-
Appointed Arbitrators in International Commercial Arbitration,” 14 (4) Arb Int 395 (1998) where they 
said, “It is also a truism that a party will strive to select an arbitrator who has some inclination or 
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natural and unexceptional aspect of the party appointment system in international 
arbitration.”53 This implies there is a relationship between predisposition and 
appearance of bias. So, what does it mean to be ‘predisposed’? Black’s Law 
Dictionary defines disposition with respect to a mental state as, “an attitude, 
prevailing tendency or inclination.”54 Thus predisposition may mean a focus on the 
arbitrator’s state of mind (which is inclined towards the appointing party) before he 
enters into the dispute. The natural follow on question becomes, is it possible for an 
arbitrator to be ‘predisposed’ and yet not be positively biased such as to raise a 
‘justifiable doubt’55 in the ‘eyes of the (other) party’?56 Opinions on this question 
apparently differ. No answer is proffered in this article. It therefore requires further 
investigation and empirical research.57  
 
The ICC court does not disclose the criteria it adopts in selecting arbitrators. It has 
been noted that when the ICC has to appoint arbitrators, “the Court asks one of the 60 
National Committees of the ICC to propose an arbitrator.”58 The Court takes the 
provisions of its rules into account in nominating the National Committee that would 
propose the arbitrator for appointment.59 However, the very process of selecting one 
arbitrator above others for appointment is not disclosed. It must be mentioned that all 
institutions take cognisance of the provisions of their rules, the arbitration agreement 
and any peculiarities of the particular dispute in selecting arbitrators for appointment.    
 
Arbitration commentators all generally agree on the need for very limited 
communication on the case itself between the interviewing parties and the prospective 
arbitrators.60 Various codes of ethics also deal expressly with these matters. A 
description of the various methods adopted by arbitrators and parties is summarised, 
“Some arbitrators refuse to communicate ex parte with the parties beyond supplying 
certain relevant information such as their curriculum vitae, fees and availability. They 
do however seek from the parties information about the case so that they can 
determine conflict of interests, their own suitability and availability, … Others agree 
to be interviewed and be informed about the case in greater detail as long as a 
transcript of the interview is made available to the other side and the co-arbitrators.”61  
 
Rule 5 of the IBA Rules of Ethics require a prospective arbitrator to make ‘sufficient 
enquiries’ so that s/he can make informed decision regarding her/his impartiality, 
independence, disclosure, competence and availability. The arbitrator can also 
                                                                                                                                            
predisposition to favour that party’s side of the case such as by sharing the appointing party’s legal or 
cultural background or by holding doctrinal views that, fortuitously, coincide with a party’s case.” 
53
 Doak Bishop & Lucy Reed, ibid at 396 
54
 Black’s Law Dictionary at 471 (6th ed.  West Publ. 1990) 
55
 The Model Law test under article 12 
56
 The ICC subjective standard under article 7 (2) and General Standard 3 (a) of Part 1 of the Second 
Draft of the proposed IBA Guidelines on Impartiality, Independence and Disclosure in International 
Commercial Arbitration, of August 22 2003 
57
 Doak Bishop & Lucy Reed, op. cit. at 424, produced a list of matters to be discussed at such 
interviews and not be in breach of any rules, codes of ethics or arbitration practice. 
58
 Christophe Imhoos, “The ICC Arbitral Process: Constituting the Arbitral Tribunal”, 2 (2) ICC 
Bulletin 3 at 5 (1991). There are currently national committees in 80 Countries 
http://www.iccwbo.org/court/english/arbitration/introduction.asp last visited 3 December 2004. 
59
 See, Grigera Naon, op. cit. at 309 
60
 The question of ex parte communications and/or discussions on the merits (to safeguard prejudging 
the case with implications for imputation of bias) seem to dominate  issues of selection of arbitrators. 
61
 Lew, Mistelis & Kroll, at  para.10-34 
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respond to questions from the parties aimed at determining her/his ‘suitability and 
availability’. All such communication is dependent on the merits of the case not being 
discussed. This is irrespective of a transcript of the discussions being made 
available.62   
 
Appointment Procedures 
 
Ad Hoc Arbitration 
After the interviews of various prospective arbitrators, parties choose one to be 
appointed. In ad hoc arbitration, the nominee will simply be informed of his 
nomination. Once the nominee accepts, the appointment will be concluded and the 
other party notified of the names and details of the appointee. The other party would 
possibly go through the same process to appoint its arbitrator and give necessary 
notifications. The two party-appointed arbitrators would then meet to appoint the 
chairman.  
 
In ad hoc arbitrations the relevance of the law of the seat of arbitration cannot be 
overemphasized. The non-mandatory provisions of the relevant law act as gap-fillers 
and make default provisions. These provisions would therefore apply in 
circumstances where the parties have not either made any provisions or provided 
otherwise. The parties cannot contract out of the mandatory provisions of the relevant 
law. This is regardless of the arbitration being ad hoc or institutional. The rationale 
being that the provisions of the arbitration agreement, to the extent that it conflicts 
with the mandatory provisions of the relevant law, would be invalid and have no legal 
effect. Thus since the rules of the relevant institution is part of the arbitration 
agreement, it shares this same fate with it. 
 
In most jurisdictions, the provisions of arbitration laws regarding the constitution of 
the arbitral tribunal are not couched in mandatory terms. This is to accord recognition 
and acceptance of the principle of party autonomy. It also exemplifies the importance 
States attach to parties choosing their arbitrators. It must be acknowledged that most 
laws do not make provisions detailing how parties may select the arbitrators. The 
uniform thread is to provide for a default number of arbitrators and how the arbitral 
tribunal may be constituted. The Model Law in chapter III provides for the 
composition of the arbitral tribunal. It recognizes the primacy of the freedom of the 
parties to determine the number of arbitrators and the appointment procedure. Where 
the parties fail to make this determination, the tribunal would then be composed of 
three arbitrators.63 Some laws make a default provision for a sole arbitrator;64 some 
refer to an uneven number of arbitrators65 while others refer the matter to a court to 
decide.66 
 
                                                 
62
 See also Rule 4.1 & 4.2 SIAC Code of Ethics for Arbitrators where arbitrators can only enquire as to 
the general nature of the case, names of the parties and expected time period for the proceeding, before 
accepting appointment. 
63
 Article 10 Model Law; Article 1681 Judicial Code 1998, Belgium; Article 1034 (1) Arbitration Law 
1998, Germany; Article 10 (2) Law 5338-1 of 1993, Russia  
64
 See S. 15 (3) EAA; S. 10(2) Arbitration and Conciliation Act, India. 
65
 See Article 30 Arbitration Law, PR China; Article 1026 (1) Arbitration Act, The Netherlands 1986; 
Article 1453 NCPC, France; S.10 (2) India; S. 15 (2) EAA 
66
 See article 1026 (2) The Netherlands; Article 179 (2) PIL, Switzerland 1990; S.5 FAA, USA 1925 
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On procedure for composition of the arbitral tribunal, the default provisions of the 
laws also vary. The Model Law expects the parties to agree on the sole arbitrator, 
failing which the appointment will be made by the appointing authority (if any) or the 
court.67 In a panel of arbitrators, “each party shall appoint one arbitrator, and the two 
arbitrators thus appointed shall appoint the third arbitrator; - - -.”68 This is a 
mandatory provision of the Model Law in recognition of the freedom of the parties to 
choose their arbitrators. The party-appointed arbitrators (acting for the parties) choose 
the presiding arbitrator.  
 
At this stage the arbitral tribunal is not yet composed. The party appointees can 
therefore validly act for the appointing parties in constituting the tribunal.69 The party 
appointee would be acting within its mandate if he consults with the appointing party 
or its counsel in the choice of candidate for the position of presiding arbitrator. The 
two party-appointed arbitrators would therefore jointly interview any candidates for 
the position. They would be acting in furtherance of their mandate and on behalf of 
their individual appointor. Once a choice is agreed upon and the appointment made, 
the arbitral tribunal would be constituted. The arbitral tribunal is constituted after the 
last arbitrator has accepted appointment.70 It is at this point, that the party-appointed 
arbitrators and the presiding arbitrator become an arbitral tribunal fully independent 
and separate from the parties. The fact that the parties directly appointed some 
members of the arbitral tribunal becomes moot. The parties have directly and/or 
indirectly appointed the members of the arbitral tribunal.71    
 
Institutional Arbitration 
Arbitration institution rules make different provisions regarding this. The common 
thread is that the parties can agree on the appointment procedure. Under the ICC 
Rules where the parties have agreed an appointment procedure, they may nominate 
the sole arbitrator for confirmation by the Secretary General of the ICC.72 Under 
CIETAC, the parties may jointly authorize the Chairman of the Arbitration 
Commission to appoint a sole arbitrator.73 The Rules of the Arbitration Court attached 
to the Hungarian Chamber of Commerce, requires the claimant to designate the sole 
arbitrator in its statement of claim and the respondent to accept such designation.74 
The LCIA appoints the sole arbitrator.75  
 
The rules make default provisions where the appointing procedure provided by the 
parties fail or is frustrated by one party, The ICC court will make the appointment76; 
                                                 
67
 Article 11 (3) (b) Model Law; Article 1682, Belgium; Article 31, PRC 
68
 Article 11 (3) (a) Model Law 
69
 See Article 5.2 IBA Rules of Ethics 
70
 Article 1452 NCCP France 
71
 Some laws provide for the parties or appointing authority or the court to appoint the presiding 
arbitrator. Regardless of who makes the appointment, the same result should be achieved. 
72
 Article 8 (3) ICC Rules; Under article 6.1 AAA IA Rules, the parties agree on the procedure for the  
appointment of the sole arbitrator; Article 2 (1) Cairo RCICA Rules also mandate the parties to 
nominate the sole arbitrator. Article 5 (2) Milan CNIA IA Rules provide for the parties to jointly 
designate the sole arbitrator. 
73
 Article 25 CIETAC Rules 
74
 Article 18 (6) Hungary CC Rules 
75
 Article 5.4 LCIA Rules 
76
 Article 8 (3) ICC Rules 
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the Chairman of the Arbitration Commission under CIETAC will appoint77; the 
Arbitration Court of the Hungary Chamber of Commerce will make the default 
appointment.78 In Milan, The Arbitral Council will appoint79 while in Tunis the 
Center’s Scientific Council will make the appointment.80 The Administrator of the 
AAA will only make a default appointment if so requested by a party.81 The SCC 
Institute would appoint the sole arbitrator.82 
 
Some institutions reserve the right to confirm an appointee of the parties. This ensures 
the institution retains control over the quality of arbitrators sitting under its rules. It 
has implications for the reputation of the institutions but more importantly has 
contractual implications. The arbitration institution has contracted with the parties to 
appoint on their behalf arbitrators in accordance with its rules. The parties are given 
the opportunity of nominating arbitrators of their choice. However, the choice of the 
parties is subject to approval by the institution. The parties have contracted out the 
administration and management of the arbitration to the institution who then becomes 
contractually bound to the parties to comply with its own rules. Not even the parties 
can then turn around and nominate for appointment arbitrators who do not meet the 
basic requirements of the rules of the relevant institution.83   
 
An example of such control by institutions is article 7.1 LCIA Rules. It provides, “If 
the parties have agreed that any arbitrator is to be appointed by one or more of them 
or by a third person, that agreement shall be treated as an agreement to nominate an 
arbitrator for all purposes. Such nominee may only be appointed by the LCIA Court 
as arbitrator subject to his prior compliance with Article 5.3 (perquisites to be 
fulfilled). The LCIA Court may refuse to appoint any such nominee if it determines 
that he is not suitable or independent or impartial.”84   
Other rules control the quality of party-appointed arbitrators by providing and 
maintaining a List or Panel of Arbitrators from which the parties may choose.85 
 
There is therefore a practical difference between the parties ‘appointing’ the 
arbitrators and ‘nominating’ arbitrators for appointment by institutions.86 The 
appointment of the party-nominated arbitrator must be confirmed by the institution 
before it becomes effective.87 This does not infringe on party autonomy. To the 
contrary it depicts party autonomy in all its glory. The Parties by their arbitration 
agreement have appointed the arbitration institution to administer the dispute in 
accordance with its rules. These rules, the parties adopt as part and parcel of their 
arbitration agreement. In honour of this, the rules allow the parties to make 
                                                 
77
 Article 25 para.2 CIETAC Rules 
78
 Article 18 (7) HCCI Rules 
79
 Article 5.2 CNIA Milan Rules 
80
 Article 2.2 TCCA Rules 
81
 Article 6.3 AAA IA Rules 
82
 Article 16 (5) SCC Rules 
83
 Such an action would amount to a breach of the terms of the arbitration agreement. 
84
 See also Article 9 (2) ICC Rules; Article 5. 3 (c) Milan CNIA Rules 
85
 Article 10 CIETAC Rules; Articles 12 – 16 ICSID Convention 
86
 Article 5 (1) Swiss Rules prefer the word ‘designation’ which are still subject to confirmation by the 
relevant Chambers. 
87
 The Swiss Rules expressly provide that the appointment becomes effective when confirmed by the 
relevant Chambers. See Article 5 (1)  
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nominations, thus participating in performing one of the major functions they 
contracted out to the institution.  
 
It can therefore be concluded that in institutional arbitration, the particular institution 
retains ultimate control over who is appointed arbitrator, irrespective of how 
predisposed and not overtly biased a party nominee may be. This is further confirmed 
by the fact that in challenge proceedings, the rules provide that the arbitration 
institution’s decision is final and even in some cases without reasons given.88  The 
above sampling of rules show that in institutional arbitration, party autonomy prevails 
in the selection and appointment of arbitrators. The fundamental right of parties to 
appoint arbitrators is balanced with the need to prevent the frustration of the 
arbitration process by the inactivity or lack of cooperation of one party. 
 
UNCITRAL in its ‘Notes on Organizing Arbitral Proceedings’ does not give any 
guidance on the different modes that can be employed in the selection of arbitrators. It 
was designed to, “assist arbitration practitioners by listing and briefly describing 
questions on which appropriately timed decisions on organizing arbitral proceedings 
may be useful.”89 The very important question of how to select arbitrators ought to be 
one of those timed decisions. The Notes deal with practical issues that would make 
for smoother arbitral proceedings. UNCITRAL may need to consider looking at the 
proposition of drafting guidelines on the selection process adopted for international 
arbitrators itself. The IBA Rules of Ethics for International Arbitrators, as other rules 
on ethics, deals with questions of impartiality, independence and disclosure (and 
related issues) by arbitrators. It does not deal directly with questions regarding the 
selection process of arbitrators. There is an obvious gap in this area that needs to be 
filled.  
 
Conclusion 
 
It has been shown that parties (and their lawyers) involved in international arbitration, 
increasingly interview prospective arbitrators as part of the selection process. There is 
no uniform practice in this area and arbitration laws, rules or codes do not directly 
regulate such matters. Arbitration laws and rules give the parties the freedom of 
deciding the number and appointment procedure of the arbitrators. The procedures 
parties adopt in effecting such appointment (or nomination) are not mentioned. This it 
is suggested may be to keep flexible the fundamental right of the parties to choose 
their arbitrators, directly or indirectly. Parties choosing arbitrators, is an 
internationally recognized right and power of the parties. Arbitration laws and rules 
make default provisions regulating this issue where parties have failed to make any 
express provisions. All arbitration laws and rules make detailed default provisions for 
the appointment of arbitrators.  
 
                                                 
88
 See the various rules. It is quite clear that challenge decisions of arbitration institutions can be 
challenged before the relevant national court. This is usually the court of the seat of arbitration. An 
example is AT&T & Lucent Technologies Inc. v Saudi Cable Co. The Times, 23 May (2000) the 
challenge had been decided by the ICC Court. In the USA the courts have clearly stated that they 
would defer to the decision of the arbitral institution in such matters. See York Hannover Holding A.G. 
v AAA & ors XX YBCA 856 (1995)  
89
 Introduction to the Notes available at www.uncitral.org 
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An international standard for the selection process of arbitrators is yet to be found. It 
is suggested that some empirical research into how international arbitrators are 
currently selected by parties, appointing authorities, arbitration institutions and courts, 
would assist in the formulation of any guidelines on this practice. Such a guideline is 
necessary to maintain and enhance the transparency of arbitral practice.   
 
 
 
 
       
